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Abstract
With more than 300 million cards sold, HID iClass is one
of the most popular contactless smart cards on the market. It
is widely used for access control, secure login and payment
systems. The card uses 64-bit keys to provide authenticity
and integrity. The cipher and key diversification algorithms
used in iClass are proprietary and little information about
them is publicly available. In this paper we have reverse
engineered all security mechanisms in the card including
cipher, authentication protocol and also key diversification
algorithms, which we publish in full detail. Furthermore, we
have found six critical weaknesses that we exploit in two
attacks, one against iClass Standard and one against iClass
Elite (a.k.a., iClass High Security). In order to recover a
secret card key, the first attack requires one authentication
attempt with a legitimate reader and 222 queries to a card.
This attack has a computational complexity of 240 MAC
computations. The whole attack can be executed within a
day on ordinary hardware. Remarkably, the second attack
which is against iClass Elite is significantly faster. It directly
recovers the system wide master key from only 15 authenti-
cation attempts with a legitimate reader. The computational
complexity of this attack is lower than 225 MAC computa-
tions, which means that it can be fully executed within 5
seconds on an ordinary laptop.
1. Introduction
iClass is an ISO/IEC 15693 [ISO00], [ISO06], [ISO09]
compatible contactless smart card manufactured by HID
Global. It was introduced in the market back in 2002 as
a secure replacement of the HID Prox card which did
not have any cryptographic capabilities. The iClass cards
are widely used in access control of secured buildings
such as The Bank of America Merrill Lynch, the Inter-
national Airport of Mexico City and the United States
Navy base of Pearl Harbor [Cum06] among many others
(see http://hidglobal.com/mediacenter.php?cat2=2). Other ap-
plications include secure user authentication such as in the
naviGO system included in Dell’s Latitude and Precision
laptops; e-payment like in the FreedomPay and SmartCentric
systems; and billing of electric vehicle charging such as in
the Liberty PlugIns system. iClass has also been incorporated
into the new BlackBerry phones which support Near Field
Communication (NFC). iClass uses a proprietary cipher to
provide data integrity and mutual authentication between
card and reader. The cipher uses a 64-bit diversified key
which is derived from a 56-bit master key and the serial
number of the card. This key diversification algorithm is built
into all iClass readers. The technology used in the card is
covered by US Patent 6058481 and EP 0890157. The precise
description of both the cipher and the key diversification
algorithms are kept secret by the manufacturer following the
principles of security by obscurity. HID distinguishes two
system configurations for iClass, namely iClass Standard and
iClass Elite. The main differences between iClass Standard
and iClass Elite lies in their key management and key
diversification algorithms. Remarkably, all iClass Standard
cards worldwide share the same master key for the iClass
application. This master key is stored in the EEPROM
memory of every iClass reader. Our analysis uncovers this
key. In iClass Elite, however, it is possible to let HID generate
and manage a custom key for your system if you are willing
to pay a higher price. The iClass Elite Program (a.k.a., High
Security) uses an additional key diversification algorithm (on
top of the iClass Standard key diversification) and a custom
master key per system which according to HID provides “the
highest level of security” [HID09].
2. Research context and related work
Over the last few years, much attention has been
paid to the (in)security of the cryptographic mecha-
nisms used in contactless smart cards [GdKGM+08],
[GvRVWS10], [PN12], [VGB12]. Experience has shown
that the secrecy of proprietary ciphers does not con-
tribute to their cryptographic strength. Most notably the
Mifare Classic, which has been thoroughly broken in
the last few years [NESP08], [dKGHG08], [GdKGM+08],
[GvRVWS09], [Cou09]. Other prominent examples include
KeeLoq [Bog07], [KKMP09], Megamos [VGE13] and
Hitag2 [COQ09], [SNC09], [vN11], [SHXZ11], [VGB12]
used in car keys, CryptoRF [GvRVWS10], [BKZ11],
[BGV+12] used in access control and payment systems and
the A5/1 [Gol97], DECT [LST+09] and GMR [DHW+12]
ciphers used in cordless/GSM phones. HID proposes iClass
as a migration option for systems using Mifare Classic, boost-
ing that iClass provides “improved security, performance and
data integrity”1. The details of the security mechanisms of
iClass remained secret for almost one decade.
During the course of our research Kim, Jung, Lee, Jung
and Han have made a technical report [KJL+11] available
online describing independent reverse engineering of the
cipher used in iClass. Their research takes a very different,
hardware oriented approach. They recovered most of the
cipher by slicing the chip and analyzing the circuits with
a microscope. Our approach, however, is radically different
as our reverse engineering is based on the disassembly of
the reader’s firmware and the study of the communication
behavior of tags and readers. Furthermore, the description of
the cipher by Kim et al. contains a major flaw. Concretely,
their key byte selection function in the cipher is different
from the one used in iClass which results in incompatible
keys. Kim et al. have proposed two key recovery attacks.
The first one is theoretical, in the sense that it assumes that
an adversary has access to a MAC oracle over messages
of arbitrary length. This assumption is unrealistic since
neither the card nor the reader provide access to such a
powerful oracle. Their second attack requires full control
over a legitimate reader in order to issue arbitrary commands.
Besides this assumption, it requires 242 online authentication
queries which, in practice, would take more than 710 years
to gather. Our attacks, however, are practical in the sense that
they can be executed within a day and require only wireless
communication with a genuine iClass card/reader.
2.1. Research contribution
The contribution of this paper consists of several parts.
First it describes the reverse engineering of the built-in
key diversification algorithm of iClass Standard. The basic
diversification algorithm, which also forms the basis for
iClass Elite key diversification, consists of two parts: a cipher
that is used to encrypt the identity of the card; and a key
fortification function, called hash0 in HID documentation,
which is intended to add extra protection to the master key.
We show that the key fortification function hash0 is
actually not one-way nor collision resistant and therefore
it adds little protection to the master key. To demonstrate
1. http://www.hidglobal.com/pr.php?id=393
this, we give the inverse function hash0−1 that on input of
a 64 bit bitstring outputs a modest amount (on average 4)
of candidate pre-images. This results in our first attack on
the iClass Standard key diversification that recovers a master
key from an iClass reader which is of comparable complexity
to that of breaking single DES. It only uses weaknesses in
the key diversification algorithm. Since in the end it comes
down to breaking DES, it can be accomplished within a few
days on a RIVYERA (a generic massively parallel FPGA-
computer, see http://www.sciengines.com). This is extremely
sensitive since there is only one master key for all iClass
Standard readers and from this master key all diversified card
keys can be computed. As a faster alternative, it is possible
to emulate a predefined card identity and use a DES rainbow
table [Hel80], [Oec03] based on this identity to perform the
attack. This allows an adversary to recover the master key
even within minutes.
Furthermore, we have fully reverse engineered iClass’s
proprietary cipher and authentication protocol. This task
of reverse engineering is not trivial since it was first nec-
essary to bypass the read protection mechanisms of the
microcontroller used in the readers in order to retrieve its
firmware [GdKGVM12]. This process is explained later
in Section 5. We also found serious vulnerabilities in the
cipher that enable an adversary to recover the secret card
key by just wirelessly communicating with the card. The
potential impact of this second and improved attack against
iClass Standard is vast since when it is combined with the
vulnerabilities in the key diversification algorithm, which we
exploited earlier, it allows an adversary to use this secret
key to recover the master key. Additionally, we have reverse
engineered the iClass Elite key diversification algorithm
which we also describe in full detail. We show that this
algorithm has even more serious vulnerabilities than the
iClass Standard key diversification. In our third and last
attack, an adversary is able to directly recover an “Elite”
master key by simply communicating with a legitimate iClass
reader.
Concretely, we propose three key recovery attacks: one
on the iClass Standard key diversification, one against iClass
Standard and one against iClass Elite. All attacks allow an
adversary to recover the master key.
• The first attack, against iClass Standard key diversi-
fication, exploits the fact that the key diversification
algorithm can be inverted. An adversary needs to let
the genuine reader issue a key update command. The
card key will be updated and from the eavesdropped
communication the adversary learns the card key. The
adversary proceeds by inverting the key diversification
which results in a modest amount of pre-images. Now,
only a bruteforce attack on single DES will reveal which
master key was used.
• The second attack, against iClass Standard, exploits a
total of four weaknesses in the cipher, key diversifi-
cation algorithm and card implementation. In order to
execute this attack the adversary first needs to eavesdrop
one legitimate authentication session between the card
and reader. Then it runs 219 key updates and 222
authentication attempts with the card. This takes less
than six hours to accomplish (when using a Proxmark III
as a reader) and recovers 24 bits of the card key. Finally,
off-line, the adversary needs to search for the remaining
40 bits of the key. Having recovered the card key, the
adversary gains full control over the card. Furthermore,
computing the master key from the card key is as hard
as breaking single DES and is done like in the first
attack.
• The third attack, concerning iClass Elite, exploits two
weaknesses in the key diversification algorithm and
recovers the master key directly. In order to run this
attack the adversary only needs to run 15 authentication
attempts with a legitimate reader. Afterwards, off-line,
the adversary needs to compute only 225 DES encryp-
tions in order to recover the master key. This attack,
from beginning to end runs within 5 seconds on ordinary
hardware.
We have executed all attacks in practice and verified these
claims and attack times. These results, previously appeared
in abbreviated form as [GdKGV11], [GdKGVM12].
2.2. Outline
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3 starts with a
description of the iClass architecture, the functionality of the
card, the cryptographic algorithms. Then, Section 4 describes
the reverse engineering of the key diversification scheme that
is used in iClass Standard. Here, we also give an attack
against this iClass Standard key diversification that recovers
the master key from a diversified key. This attack method
forms the basis for the second attack against iClass Standard
where it is used to recover the master key in its last step.
The second attack itself is described in Section 6 after the
reverse engineering and description of the cipher in Section 5.
Finally, Section 7 describes the key diversification in iClass
Elite and presents an attack against this scheme.
3. iClass
An HID iClass card is in fact a pre-configured and re-
branded PicoPass card manufactured by Inside Secure2. HID
configures and locks the cards so that the configuration
settings can no longer be modified. This section describes
in detail the functionality and security mechanisms of iClass
and it also describes the reverse engineering process. Let us
first introduce notation.
Notation: Throughout this article ε denotes the empty bit-
string. ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive or. ⊞ denotes addition
2. http://www.insidesecure.com/eng/Products/Secure-Solutions/PicoPass
modulo 256. a ← b denotes the assignment of a value b
to variable a. Given two bitstrings x and y, xy denotes
their concatenation. Sometimes we write this concatenation
explicitly with x · y to improve readability. x denotes the
bitwise complement of x. 0n denotes a bitstring of n zero-bits.
Similarly, 1n denotes a bitstring of n one-bits. Furthermore,
given a bitstring x∈ (Fk2)
l , we denote with x[i] the i-th element
y ∈ Fk2 of x. We write yi to denote the i-th bit of y. For
example, given the bitstring x = 0x010203 ∈ (F82)
3 and
y← x[2] then y= 0x03 and y6 = 1.
Remark 3.1 (Byte representation): Throughout this paper,
bytes are represented with their most significant bit on
the left. However, the least significant bit is transmitted
first over the air during wireless communication (compliant
with ISO/IEC 15693). This is the same order in which
the bits are input to the cryptographic functions. In other
words, 0x0a0b0c is transmitted and processed as input
0x50d030.
3.1. Functionality
iClass cards come in two versions called 2KS and 16KS with
respectively 256 and 4096 bytes of memory. The memory of
the card is divided into blocks of eight bytes as shown in
Figure 1. Memory blocks 0, 1, 2 and 5 are publicly readable.
They contain the card identifier id, configuration bits, the
card challenge cC and issuer information. Block 3 and 4
contain two diversified cryptographic keys k1 and k2 which
are derived from two different master keys K 1 and K 2.
These master keys are referred to in the documentation as
debit key and credit key. The card only stores the diversified
keys k1 and k2. The remaining memory blocks are divided
into two areas, which are represented by the host software
as applications. The size of these applications is defined by
the configuration block.
The first application of an iClass card is the HID appli-
cation which stores the card identifier, PIN code, password
and other information used in access control systems. Read
and write access to the HID application requires a valid
mutual authentication using the cipher to prove knowledge
of k1. The master key of the HID application is a global
key known to all iClass Standard compatible readers. The
globally used key K 1 is kept secret by HID Global and is
not shared with any customer or industrial partner. Recovery
of this key undermines the security of all systems using
iClass Standard. Two methods have been proposed [Mer10],
[GdKGV11] to recover this key. To circumvent the obvious
limitations of having only a global master key, iClass Elite
uses a different key diversification algorithm that allows
having custom master keys. The details regarding iClass Elite
can be found in Section 7.1. The second global master key
K 2 is used in both iClass Standard and Elite systems and
it is available to any developer who signs a non-disclosure
agreement with HID global. It is possible to extract this key
Block Content Description
0 Card serial number Identifier id
1 Configuration
2 e-Purse Card challenge cC
3 Key for application 1 Diversified debit key k1
4 Key for application 2 Diversified credit key k2
5 Application issuer area
6. . . 18 Application 1 HID application
19. . .n Application 2 User defined memory
publicly readable
write-only after authentication
read-write after authentication
Figure 1: Memory layout of an iClass card
from publicly available software binaries [GdKGV11]. In
addition, the document [HID06] contains this master key and
is available online. This key K 2 can be used by developers
to protect the second application, although in practice, K 2
is hardly ever used or modified.
The card provides basic memory operations like read and
write. These operations have some non-standard behavior and
therefore we describe them in detail.
• The read command takes as input an application
number a and a memory block number n and returns
the memory content of this block. This command has
the side effect of selecting the corresponding key (k1
for application 1 or k2 for application 2) in the cipher
and then it feeds the content of block n into the internal
state of the cipher. Cryptographic keys are not readable.
When the block number n corresponds to the address
where a cryptographic key is stored, then read returns
a bitstring of 64 ones.
• The write command takes as input a block number
n, an eight-byte payload p and a MAC of the payload
MAC(k,n · p), where k is a diversified card key. When
successful, it writes p in memory and it returns a copy
of p for verification purposes. This command has the
side effect of resetting the internal state of the cipher.
In addition, when the block number n corresponds to
the address where a cryptographic key k is stored, the
payload is XOR-ed to the previous value instead of
overwriting it, i.e., it assigns k← k⊕ p.
Therefore, in order to update a key k to k′, the reader must
issue a write command with k⊕ k′ as payload. In this way
the card will store k ⊕ k ⊕ k′ = k′ as the new key. On the
one hand, this particular key update procedure has the special
feature that in case an adversary eavesdrops a key update he
is unable to learn the newly assigned key, provided that he
does not know k. On the other hand this introduces a new
weakness which we describe in Section 6.2.
Before being able to execute read or write commands
on the protected memory of a card, the reader needs to
get access to the corresponding application by running a
successful authentication protocol described in Section 3.2.
Cryptographic keys k1 and k2 can be seen as part of
application 1 and 2, respectively. This means that in order
to modify a key e.g., k1, the reader first needs to run a
successful authentication with k1.
3.2. Authentication protocol
This section describes the authentication protocol between
an iClass card and reader. This protocol is depicted in Fig-
ure 3 and an example trace is shown in Figure 2. First, during
the anti-collision protocol, the reader learns the identity of
the card id. Then, the reader chooses an application and
issues a read command on the card challenge cC.
This cC is called ‘e-purse’ in the iClass documenta-
tion [IC04] and it is a special memory block in the sense
that it is intended to provide freshness. In the next step, the
reader issues an authenticate command. This command
sends to the card a reader nonce nR and a MAC of the card
challenge cC concatenated with nR. This MAC is computed
using a diversified card key k. Finally, the card answers with
a MAC of cC, nR followed by 32 zero bits. For more details
over the MAC function see Section 5.2.
After a successful authentication on cC the reader is granted
read and write access within the selected application.
Remark 3.2: Since the card lacks a pseudo-random number
generator, the reader should decrement cC after a successful
authentication in order to provide freshness for the next
authentication, see Figure 2. This is not enforced by the card.
Note that cC is treated differently in the sense that when the
tag stores cC it swaps the first and last 32 bits (for reasons that
are unknown to us). Therefore 0xFDFFFFFFFFFFFFFF is
stored by the tag as 0xFFFFFFFFFDFFFFFF as shown in
Figure 2.
4. iClass Standard
In this paper we first reverse engineer the iClass Standard
key diversification. Then, we describe its weaknesses in
Section 4.3. Finally, we describe the first attack against iClass
Standard in Section 4.4.
Our first approach for reverse engineering is in line with
that of [GdKGM+08], [LST+09], [GvRVWS10] and consists
Sender Hex Abstract
Reader 0C 00 73 33 Read identifier
Tag 47 47 6C 00 F7 FF 12 E0 Card serial number id
Reader 0C 01 FA 22 Read configuration
Tag 12 FF FF FF E9 1F FF 3C iClass 16KS configuration
Reader 88 02 Read cC and select k1
Tag FE FF FF FF FF FF FF FF Card challenge cC
Reader 05 00 00 00 00 1D 49 C9 DA Reader nonce nR = 0,MAC(k1,cC ·nR)
Tag 5A A2 AF 92 Response MAC(k1,cC ·nR ·0
32)
Reader 87 02 FD FF FF FF FF FF FF FF Write on block 02 followed by
CF 3B D4 6A MAC(k1,02 · cC− 1)
Tag FF FF FF FF FD FF FF FF Update successful
Figure 2: Authenticate and decrement card challenge cC using k1 = 0xE033CA419AEE43F9
of analyzing the update card key messages sent by an iClass
compatible reader while we produce small modifications on
the key, just after the DES operation and just before it
is passed to the fortification function hash0. We used an
Omnikey reader that supports iClass. Still, we first had to
bypass the encryption layer of the Omnikey Secure Mode
that is used in its USB communication in order to control
the reader messages [GdKGV11]. We reverse engineered
the Omnikey Secure Mode and wrote a library that is
capable of communicating in Omnikey Secure Mode to any
Omnikey reader. To eavesdrop the contactless interface we
have built a custom firmware for the Proxmark III in order to
intercept ISO/IEC 15693 [ISO09] frames. We have released
the library, firmware and an implementation of hash0 under
the GNU General Public License and they are available at
http://www.proxmark.org.
Reader Card
id, cC
nR,MAC(k, cC · nR)
MAC(k, cC · nR · 0
32)
Figure 3: Authentication protocol
Later in Section 5, we use a different approach for reverse
engineering the cipher and the key diversification for iClass
Elite. In this approach we first recover the firmware from an
iClass reader. Then, by disassembling the firmware we are
able to recover the cipher and key diversification for iClass
Elite. The knowledge about the structure of hash0 which
we describe in this section did help a lot in identifying the
interesting parts of the firmware for reverse engineering.
4.1. Black box reverse engineering
This section describes how hash0 [Cum06] (a.k.a.
h0 [Cum03]) was reverse engineered. The final description
of hash0 is given in Section 4.2. The method used to reverse
engineer hash0 studies the input-output relations of hash0
in order to recover its internal structure. The primary goal
is to learn how a card key k is derived from a master key
K and the card identity id. The general structure of the key
derivation is known. First, the iClass reader encrypts a card
identity id with the master key K , using single DES. The
resulting ciphertext is then input to hash0 which outputs the
diversified key k.
k = hash0(DESenc(K , id))
We define the function flip that takes an input c and flips
a specific bit in c. By flipping a bit we mean taking the
complement of this bit. The definition flip is as follows.
Definition 4.1: Let the function flip : F642 ×N → F
64
2 be
defined as
flip(c,m) = c63 . . .cm+1 · cm · cm−1 . . .c0
Since we only learn the XOR difference between two hash0
outputs we define the function diff that we use to express
these XOR differences. The function diff computes the
output difference of two hash0 calls and is defined as follows.
Definition 4.2: Let the function diff : F642 ×N → F
64
2 be
defined as
diff(c,m) = hash0(c)⊕ hash0(flip(c,m))
Now we use this definition of output difference to describe
accumulative output differences of an input set C .
k∨m =
∨
c∈C
diff(c,m), k∧m =
∧
c∈C
diff(c,m)
The results are grouped by the position of the flipped bit m.
Then, the OR and AND is computed of all the results in a
group. These cumulative OR and AND values for 64 bits
that were flipped on a few thousand random 64-bit bitstrings
c ∈C are presented in Figure 5 and 6. The output difference
for flipping all possible bits is abbreviated as follows.
k∨ =
63∧
m=0
k∨m, k∧ =
63∧
m=0
k∧m
4.1.1. Gathering input-output pairs. In this section we
explain how we gather the input-output pairs for hash0
and calculate the output differences. In our setup we have
complete control over an iClass reader for which we can
set and update the keys that are used. Furthermore, we are
able to emulate iClass cards and learn all communication
between the controlled reader and (emulated) iClass card.
First, we analyze the input-output relations of hash0 on
bit level. This requires complete control over the input c
of hash0 which can be achieved in our test setup. In this
test setup we emulate a card identity id and also know,
or even can change, which master key K is used. The
following steps deliver XOR differences between two hash0
evaluations that differ only one bit in the input:
• generate a large set of random bitstrings c ∈ F642 .
• for each c
– calculate id = DESdec(c,K ) and
idm = DESdec(flip(c,m),K ) for m= 0 . . .63
– for each m authenticate with id, perform a key update,
the reader requests the card identity again, now use
idm instead of id
Keep the master key K constant during the key updates
described above. This delivers the XOR of two function eval-
uations of the form diff(c,m) = hash0(c) ⊕ hash0(flip(c,m)).
We performed this procedure for 3000 random values c ∈ C .
Experiments show that for this particular function, having
more than 3000 samples does not produce any difference on
the cumulative OR and AND tables. This amount of samples
can be obtained within a couple of days.
4.1.2. Function input partitioning. Figure 5 shows the
accumulated differences for the 48 rightmost output bits at
input c. The results for the remaining 16 leftmost output
bits are shown in Figure 6. These differences reveal that
the input c of hash0 is of the form c= x · y · z[7] . . . z[0] with
x,y ∈ F82 and z[i] ∈ F
6
2. The eight output bytes are defined as
k[0] . . .k[7] and constitute the diversified key k. We noticed
that the first 16 bits of the input exhibit a different behavior
that the rest and therefore decided to split the input in two
parts. The structure of the mask in Figure 5 is computed
with x = y = 08 and z a random bitstring. Whereas in
Figure 6 we flip only bits of x and y. This leads to the
following observations:
• z[0] . . .z[3] affects k[0] . . .k[3] and z[4] . . . z[7] affects
k[4] . . .k[7].
• z[0] . . .z[3] and z[4] . . .z[7] generate a similar structure in
the output but are mutually independent. This suggests
the use of a subfunction that is called twice, once with
input z[0] . . .z[3] and once with input z[4] . . . z[7]. We call
this function check.
• y7−i affects k[i] for i = 0 . . .7. The OR-mask for y
indicates a complement operation on the output while
the AND-mask in Figure 6 shows that k[i]0 is exclusively
affected by y for i= 0 . . .7.
• x defines a permutation. The output is scrambled after
flipping a single bit within x. The AND-mask in Fig-
ure 6 shows that k[i]7 is exclusively affected by x for
i= 0 . . .7.
• flipping bits in z never affects k[i]0 or k[i]7 . This is
inferred from the occurrences of 0x7e (01111110 in
binary representation) in Figure 5.
k[1] k[2] k[3] k[7]k[4] k[6]k[5]k[0]
x y z[7] z[6] z[5] z[4] z[3] z[2] z[1] z[0]
{ { { { { { { {
Figure 4: Schematic representation of the function hash0
bit OR-mask of AND-mask of
↓ differences in output k differences in output k
z[0]


630x7e7e7e7e00000000 0x0400000000000000
620x7e7e7e7e00000000 0x0400000000000000
610x7a7e7e7e00000000 0x0800000000000000
600x727e7e7e00000000 0x1000000000000000
590x627e7e7e00000000 0x2000000000000000
580x427e7e7e00000000 0x4000000000000000
z[1]


570x007e7e7e00000000 0x0000000000000000
. . . . . .
520x007e7e7e00000000 0x0000000000000000
z[2]


510x00007e7e00000000 0x0000000000000000
. . . . . .
460x00007e7e00000000 0x0000000000000000
z[3]


450x0000007e00000000 0x0000000000000000
. . . . . .
400x0000007e00000000 0x0000000000000000
z[4]


390x00000000027e7e7e 0x0000000002000000
380x00000000047e7e7e 0x0000000004000000
370x00000000087e7e7e 0x0000000008000000
360x00000000107e7e7e 0x0000000010000000
350x00000000207e7e7e 0x0000000020000000
340x00000000407e7e7e 0x0000000040000000
z[5]


330x00000000007e7e7e 0x0000000000000000
. . . . . .
280x00000000007e7e7e 0x0000000000000000
z[6]


270x0000000000007e7e 0x0000000000000000
. . . . . .
220x0000000000007e7e 0x0000000000000000
z[7]


210x000000000000007e 0x0000000000000000
. . . . . .
160x000000000000007e 0x0000000000000000
Figure 5: OR and AND-mask for flipping bits 16 . . .63 of c
The above observations suggest that we can recover different
parts of the function independently. Figure 4 summarizes
how different parts of the input affect specific parts of the
output. Note that from the last observation we know that
the subfunction check operates on z[i]0 . . .z[i]5 and affects
k[i]1 . . .k[i]6 . Furthermore, it is observed that the leftmost bit of
all output bytes k[i]7 and the permutation of z[i] to k[i]1 . . .k[i]6
is determined by x. Finally, every input bit y7−i is copied to
output bit k[i]0 .
Summarizing, hash0 can be split into three different parts.
The first part is the subfunction check which applies a similar
operation on z[0] . . . z[3] and z[4] . . . z[7]. In the second part a
bitwise complement operation is computed based on bits
from the input byte y. The last part applies a permutation that
is defined by the input byte x. The following sections discuss
the reverse engineering of these identified parts of hash0.
Finally, the complete hash0 definition is given in Section 7.
bit OR-mask of AND-mask of
↓ differences in output k differences in output k
y


15 0xfc00000000000000 0x8000000000000000
14 0x00fc000000000000 0x0080000000000000
13 0x0000fc0000000000 0x0000800000000000
12 0x000000fc00000000 0x0000008000000000
11 0x00000000fe000000 0x00000000fe000000
10 0x0000000000fe0000 0x0000000000fe0000
9 0x000000000000fe00 0x000000000000fe00
8 0x00000000000000fe 0x00000000000000fe
x


7 0x7f7f7f7e7e7f7f7f 0x0101010000010101
6 0x00007f7e7f000000 0x0000010001000000
5 0x7f7e7e7e7f000000 0x0100000001000000
4 0x7f7e7e7e7e7f0000 0x0100000000010000
3 0x00007f7e7e7e7f00 0x0000010000000100
2 0x7f7e7f7f7f7f7f00 0x0100010101010100
1 0x7f7e7f7e7e7f7f00 0x0100010000010100
0 0x7f7e7f7e7f7e7f00 0x0100010001000100
Figure 6: OR and AND-mask for flipping bits 0 . . .15 of c
4.1.3. Subfunction check. This section describes the reverse
engineering of the subfunction check which operates on two
times four 6-bit input values z[0] . . . z[3] and z[4] . . . z[7]. In order
to recover this part of the function we keep x= y= 08 and
let z vary over random bitstrings. According to Figure 5
only flipping bits in z (positions 16 to 63 of input c) does
matter for check. We write modified(x) to indicate changes
in x between two different test cases. We make modifications
to the input and see where it affects the output. We start by
looking at the following rules that are deduced from Figure 5.
modified(k[0])→ modified(z[7])∧¬modified(z[0] . . . z[6])
modified(k[4])→ modified(z[3])∧¬modified(z[0] . . . z[2])
∧¬modified(z[4] . . . z[7])
Note that k[4]1 . . .k[4]6 = z[3]. For k[0] it is harder to find a
function since flipping a single bit in z[7] may affect multiple
bits in k[0]. The relation between z[7] and k[0] becomes more
clear when we look at specific input patterns and their
corresponding output difference in Figure 7. The stars in the
input pattern for z[7] denote a bit that can be either 0 or 1
without affecting the output difference of k[0]. Note that, of
course, the input bit that is being flipped can also be either 0
or 1 and is therefore also denoted by a star. We try to capture
the output differences for flipping all possible bits between
two different inputs c. We write z7 when the bit flip is set to
zero and z˘7 when is set to one.
z[7] of c diff(c,63)[0] z[7] of c diff(c,62)[0]
****0* 06 *****0 04
***01* 0e ***0*1 0c
**011* 1e **01*1 1c
*0111* 3e *011*1 3c
11111* 7c 0111*1 7c
01111* 7e 1111*1 7e
Figure 7: Input-output relations for z[7] ↔ k[0]
The difference k∨[0] based on flipping bits in z[7] is:
k∨[0]1 . . .k
∨
[0]6
= (z7 mod 63)+ 1⊕ (z˘7 mod 63)+ 1
from which we deduce that
k[0]1 . . .k[0]6 = (z7 mod 63)+ 1 (1)
The remaining k[1]1 . . .k[1]6 , k[2]1 . . .k[2]6 and k[3]1 . . .k[3]6 can
be found in a similar way by flipping bits in the input and
closely looking at the input-output relations. For more details
on the reverse engineering of this function see [GdKGV11].
The complete definition of the function is given in Sec-
tion 4.2. Eventually, the modulo operations are separated
from the subfunction check and defined in the main function
hash0. Also, the definition in Section 4.2 clarifies why the
subfunction is called check. It checks equalities between the
different components of z and affects the output accordingly.
4.1.4. Complement byte. The second byte of the input c is
the complement byte y. It performs a complement operation
on the output of the function as Figure 6 clearly shows.
Flipping bit y7−i results in the complement of k[i]0 in the
output, for i= 0 . . .7. Note that no other input bit influences
any least significant output bit of the output bytes k[i]0 .
Furthermore, k[i]1 . . .k[i]6 are flipped, however, keep in mind
that we do not involve the action of byte x at this point,
which prevents any permutation of the output.
Finally, every k[i]7 is not affected. It is important to observe
that for k[4] . . .k[7] the OR and AND-mask agree that the left
7 bits are always flipped while for k[0] . . .k[3] this is not true.
To be precise, the bits k[i]6 for i= 0 . . .3 are never flipped. We
found that the output value z[ j] that constitutes output byte
k[i] is decremented by one if j ≤ 3 except when y7−i = 0.
4.1.5. Permute byte. Finally, the byte x defines a permu-
tation. Iterating over x while y and z[0] . . .z[7] are constants
shows that x is taken modulo 70. This follows from the fact
that the output values repeat every 70 inputs. The cumulative
bitmasks of the output differences, shown in Figure 6, do
not provide information about the permutation but do show
that k[i]7 is affected. Experiments show that x is an injective
mapping on k[i]7 for i= 0 . . .7. This means that it is possible
to learn x by looking at the least significant output bits k[i]7 .
Furthermore, we conclude that the permutation is inde-
pendent of y and z. This means that a permutation function
permute can be constructed which takes x mod 70 as input
and returns a particular mapping. We could recover this
permutation because the values for k[i]7 , for i= 0 . . .7, directly
relate to a unique mapping of the z input. The hash0 function
can be split up into check and permute subfunctions and is
defined in Section 4.2.
4.2. The function hash0
The following sequence of definitions precisely describe
the recovered function hash0. The details of this construction
are not necessary to understand the attacks presented in
Section 6.5 and Section 7.3.
The function hash0 first computes x′ = x mod 70 which
results in 70 possible permutations. Then for all zi the modu-
lus and additions are computed before calling the subfunction
check.
Then, the subfunction check is called twice, first on input
z′0, . . . ,z
′
3 and then on input z
′
4, . . . ,z
′
7. The definition of the
function check is as follows.
Definition 4.3: Let the function check : (F62)
8 → (F62)
8 be
defined as
check(z[0] . . . z[7]) = ck(3,2,z[0] . . . z[3]) · ck(3,2,z[4] . . . z[7])
where ck : N×N× (F62)
4 → (F62)
4 is defined as
ck(1,−1,z[0] . . .z[3]) = z[0] . . . z[3]
ck(i,−1,z[0] . . . z[3]) = ck(i− 1, i− 2,z[0] . . . z[3])
ck(i, j,z[0] . . .z[3]) ={
ck(i, j− 1,z[0] . . . z[i] ← j . . . z[3]), if z[i] = z[ j];
ck(i, j− 1,z[0] . . . z[3]), otherwise.
Definition 4.4: Define the function permute : Fn2× (F
6
2)
8×
N×N→ (F62)
8 as
permute(ε,z, l,r) = ε
permute(p0 . . . pn,z, l,r) ={
(z[l]+ 1) ·permute(p0 . . . pn−1,z, l+ 1,r), if pn = 1;
z[r] ·permute(p0 . . . pn−1,z, l,r+ 1), otherwise.
Definition 4.5: Define the bitstring pi ∈ (F82)
35 in hexadec-
imal notation as
pi = 0x0F171B1D1E272B2D2E333539363A3C474B
4D4E535556595A5C636566696A6C71727478
Each byte in this sequence is a permutation of the bitstring
00001111. Note that this list contains only the half of all
possible permutations. The other half can be computed by
taking the bit complement of each element in the list.
Finally, the definition of hash0 is as follows.
Definition 4.6: Let the function hash0 : F82×F
8
2× (F
6
2)
8→
(F82)
8 be defined as hash0(x,y,z[0] . . . z[7]) = k[0] . . .k[7] where
z′[i] = (z[i] mod (63− i))+ i i= 0 . . .3
z′[i+4] = (z[i+4] mod (64− i))+ i i= 0 . . .3
zˆ= check(z′)
p=
{
pi[x mod 35], if x7 = 1;
pi[x mod 35], otherwise.
z˜= permute(p, zˆ,0,4)
k[i] =
{
y(7−i) · z˜[i] · p(7−i)+ 1, if y(7−i) = 1;
y(7−i) · z˜[i] · p(7−i), otherwise.
i= 0 . . .7
This concludes the reverse engineering of the key diversifi-
cation algorithm that is used in iClass Standard and defined
as
k= hash0(DESenc(K , id)) .
4.3. Weaknesses in iClass Standard key diversifica-
tion
This section describes weaknesses in the design of the
Omnikey Secure Mode and on the iClass built-in key diver-
sification and fortification algorithms. These weaknesses will
be later exploited in Section 4.4.
4.3.1. Omnikey Secure Mode. Even though encrypting the
communication over USB is in principle a good practice, the
way it is implemented in the Omnikey Secure Mode adds
little security. The shared key kCUW that is used for this
practice is the same for all Omnikey readers. This key is
included in software that is publicly available online, which
only gives a false feeling of security.
4.3.2. Weak key fortification. This section clarifies why
hash0 is not strengthening the diversified key kid at all. First,
note that only the modulo operations in hash0 on x ( 256
70
)
and z[0], . . . ,z[7] are responsible for collisions in the output.
The expected number of pre-images for an output of hash0
is given by
256
70
×
64
60
×
63
∏
n=61
(
64
n
)2
≈ 4.72
When we want to invert the function hash0 we need to find
the possible inputs that generate one specific output. Once
we find a pre-image, we need to determine if there exist other
values within the input domain that lead to the same output
when the modulus is taken. Note that each input value z[i]
may have a second pre-image that maps to the same output.
Furthermore, every permute byte x has at least two other
values that map to the same output and in some cases there
is even a third one. This means that the minimal number
of pre-images is three. The probability q that for a given
random input c there are only two other pre-images is
24
70
×
60
64
×
63
∏
n=61
( n
64
)2
≈ 0.27
This means that hash0 does not add much additional protec-
tion. For example, imagine an adversary who can learn the
output kid of hash0(DESenc(K , id)) for arbitrary values id.
Then, the probability q′ for an adversary to obtain an output
kid which has only three pre-images is 1− (1− q)
n, where
n is the number of function calls using random identities id.
For n= 15 this probability becomes q′ > 0.99.
4.3.3. Inverting hash0. It is relatively easy to compute the
inverse of the function hash0. Let us first compute the inverse
of the function check. Observe that the function check−1 is
defined just as check except for one case where the condition
and assignment are swapped, see Definition 4.7.
Definition 4.7: Let the function check−1 : (F62)
8 → (F62)
8
be defined as check(z[0] . . . z[7]) in Definition 4.3 except for
the following case where
ck−1(i, j,z[0] . . .z[3]) ={
ck−1(i, j− 1,z[0] . . . z[i] ← z[ j] . . . z[3]), if z[i] = j;
ck−1(i, j− 1,z[0] . . . z[3]), otherwise.
Definition 4.8: Define the function permute−1 : Fn2 ×
(F62)
8×N×N→ (F62)
8 as
permute−1(p,z, l = 12,r) = ε
permute−1(p,z, l < 4,r) ={
(z[r]− 1) ·permute
−1(p,z, l+ 1,r+ 1), if pr = 1;
permute−1(p,z, l,r+ 1), otherwise.
permute−1(p,z, l ≥ 4,r) ={
z[l−4] ·permute
−1(p,z, l+ 1,r), if pl−4 = 0;
permute−1(p,z, l+ 1,r), otherwise.
Next, we define the function hash0−1, the inverse of hash0.
This function outputs a set C of candidate pre-images. These
pre-images output the same key k when applying hash0. The
definition of hash0−1 is as follows.
Definition 4.9: Let the function hash0−1 : (F82)
8 → {F82×
F
8
2× (F
6
2)
8} be defined as
hash0−1(k[0] . . .k[7]) = C
where
C = {x|x= x′ mod 70} × {y} ×
{z7|z7 = z˙7 mod 61} × {z6|z6 = z˙6 mod 62} ×
{z5|z5 = z˙5 mod 63} × {z4|z4 = z˙4 mod 64} ×
{z3|z3 = z˙3 mod 60} × {z2|z2 = z˙2 mod 61} ×
{z1|z1 = z˙1 mod 62} × {z0|z0 = z˙0 mod 63}
x′ is unique elem. in F82 s.t.
{
p= pi[x′ mod 35] ⇔ x
′
7 = 1
p= pi[x′ mod 35] ⇔ x
′
7 = 0
z˙[i] = z
′
[i]− (i mod 4) i= 0 . . .7
z′ = check−1(zˆ)
zˆ= permute−1(p, z˜,0,0)
z˜[i] = k
′
[i]1
. . .k′[i]6
i= 0 . . .7
pi = k′[i]7
i= 0 . . .7
k′[i] =
{
k[i]− 1, if y(7−i) = 1;
k[i], otherwise.
i= 0 . . .7
yi = k[7−i]0 i= 0 . . .7
4.3.4. Weak key diversification algorithm. The iClass
Standard key diversification algorithm uses a combination of
single DES and the proprietary function called hash0, which
we reverse engineered. Based on our findings in the preced-
ing sections, we conclude that the function hash0 is not one-
way nor collision resistant. In fact, it is possible to compute
the inverse function hash0−1 having a modest amount (on
average 4) of candidate pre-images. After recovering a secret
card key, recovering an iClass master key is not harder than a
chosen plaintext attack on single DES. The use of single DES
encryption for key diversification results in weak protection
of the master key. This is a critical weakness, especially
considering that there is only one master key for the HID
application of all iClass cards. Furthermore, the composition
of single DES with the function hash0 does not strengthen
the secret card key in any way. Even worse, when we look at
the modulo operations that are applied on the z component of
the hash0 function input, we see that this reduces the entropy
of the diversified card key with 2.23 bits.
4.4. Attacking iClass Standard key diversification
From the weaknesses that were explained in the previous
section it can be concluded that hash0 does not significantly
increase the complexity of an attack on the master key K . In
fact, the attack explained in this section requires one brute
force run on DES. For this key recovery attack we need
a strong adversary model where the adversary controls a
genuine reader and is able to issue key update commands.
Section 6.5 introduces an attack that allows a more restricted
adversary. In this case, we use a strong adversary that
controls a genuine reader, like an Omnikey reader in Secure
Mode. The adversary controls this reader and is able to issue
key update commands. An attack consists of two phases and
an adversary A needs to:
Phase 1.
• emulate a random identity id to the reader;
• issue an update key command that updates from a
known user defined master key K ′ to the unknown mas-
ter key K that A wants to recover. Now, A can obtain
kid = hash0(DESenc(K , id)) from the XOR difference;
• compute the set of pre-images C by hash0−1(kid);
• repeats Phase 1 until A obtains an output kid with |C |=
3.
Phase 2.
• A checks for every candidate DES key K ∗ ∈ {0,1}56
if DESenc(K
∗, id) = c, for every c ∈ C ;
• when the check above succeeds, A verifies the corre-
sponding key K ∗ against another set of id and kid .
We have verified this attack on the two master keys K 1 and
K 2 that are stored in the Omnikey reader for the iClass
application. The key K 2 was also stored in the naviGO
software and we could check the key against pre-images
that were selected as described above. Although we did not
find K 1 stored in software we were still able to verify it
since we could dump the EEPROM of a reader where K 1
was stored, see Section 5.1. It would have been possible to
recover hash0 from the EEPROM as well, although the prior
knowledge about hash0 allowed us to identify more quickly
where the remaining cryptographic functions were located in
the EEPROM.
The attack above comes down to a brute force attack on
single DES. A slightly different variant is to keep the card
identity id fixed and use a DES rainbow table [Hel80] that
is constructed for a specific plaintext and runs through all
possible encryptions of this plaintext. Note that the rainbow
table needs to be pre-computed and thus a fixed plaintext
must be chosen on forehand. This means that one fixed
predefined id is to be used in the attack. The number of
pre-images can no longer be controlled. In the worst case,
the total number of pre-images is 512.
Finally, note that we need a strong adversary model in this
attack. The adversary needs to control a genuine reader, by
which we mean that the adversary is able to let the reader
issue card key update commands. In a real-life setup this
is not really feasible. The reverse engineering of the cipher
and authentication protocol of iClass in Section 5 did not
only reveal the iClass security mechanisms, but also more
weaknesses that are described in Section 6. We use some of
these weaknesses to lower the requirements on the adversary
and deploy a second attack on iClass Standard, when the
adversary does not control the reader, in Section 4.4.
5. The iClass cipher
This section first describes the reverse engineering process
employed to recover the iClass cipher and to recover the
iClass Elite key diversification algorithm. Then, we only
describe the reverse engineered iClass cipher. We use this
in Section 6 to mount a second (improved) attack on iClass
Standard. The recovered key diversification for iClass Elite
and its corresponding weaknesses lead to the third attack
which is described in Section 7.
5.1. Firmware reverse engineering
In order to reverse engineer the cipher and the key diversifi-
cation algorithm, we have first recovered the firmware from
an iClass reader. For this we used a technique introduced
in [Mer10] and later used in [GdKGV11]. Next, we will
briefly describe this technique. iClass readers (Fig. 8), as
many other embedded devices, rely on the popular PIC
microcontroller (Fig. 8b) to perform their computations.
(a) iClass reader. (b) iClass reader where the epoxy resin
has been partially removed to expose the
PIC microcontroller.
Figure 8: iClass readers
These microcontrollers are very versatile and can be flashed
with a custom firmware. The (program) memory of the micro-
controller is divided into a number of blocks, each of them
having access control bits determining whether this block is
readable/writable. Even when the PIC is configured to be non-
writable, it is always possible to reset the access control bits
by erasing the memory of the chip. At first glance this feature
does not seem very helpful to our reverse engineering goals
since it erases the data in the memory. Conveniently enough,
even when the most common programming environments
do not allow it, the microcontroller supports erasure of a
single block. After patching the PIC programmer software to
support this feature, it is possible to perform the following
attack to recover the firmware:
• Buy two iClass RW400 (6121AKN0000) readers.
• Erase block 0 on one of the readers. This resets the
access control bits on block 0 to readable, writable.
• Write a small dumper program on block 0 that reads
blocks 1, . . . ,n and outputs the data via one of the
microcontroller’s output pins.
• Use the serial port of a computer to record the data.
This procedure recovers blocks 1, . . . ,n.
• Proceed similarly with the other reader, but erasing
blocks 1, . . . ,n. This in fact fills each block with NOP
operations.
• At the end of block n write a dumper program for block
0.
• At some point the program will jump to an empty block
and then reach the dumper program that outputs the
missing block 0.
Once we have recovered the firmware, it is possible to use
IDA Pro and MPLAB to disassemble, debug and reverse
engineer the algorithms.
5.2. The cipher
This section describes the iClass cipher that we recovered
from the firmware. This cipher is interesting from an aca-
demic and didactic perspective as it combines two important
techniques in the design of stream ciphers from the ’80s
and beginning of the ’90s, i.e., Fibonacci generators and
Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs). The internal state
of the iClass cipher consists of four registers as can be seen
in Figure 9. Two of these registers, which we call left (l)
and right (r) are part of the Fibonacci generator. The other
two registers constitute linear feedback shift registers top (t)
and bottom (b). In order to understand the description of
the cipher correctly, take into account that the solid lines
in Figure 9 represent byte operations while dotted lines
represent bit operations.
Definition 5.1 (Cipher state): A cipher state of iClass
s is an element of F402 consisting of the following four
components:
• the left register l = (l0 . . . l7) ∈ F
8
2;
• the right register r = (r0 . . . r7) ∈ F
8
2;
• the top register t = (t0 . . . t15) ∈ F
16
2 ;
• the bottom register b= (b0 . . .b7) ∈ F
8
2.
The cipher has an input bit which is used (among others)
during authentication to shift in the card challenge cC and
the reader nonce nR. With every clock tick a cipher state
s evolves to a successor state s′. Both LFSRs shift to
the right and the Fibonacci generator iterates using one
byte of the key (chosen by the select(·) function) and the
bottom LFSR as input. During this iteration each of these
components is updated, receiving additional input from the
other components of the cipher. With each iteration, the
cipher produces one output bit. The following sequence of
definitions describes the cipher in detail; see also Figure 9.
Definition 5.2: The feedback function for the top register
T : F162 → F2 is defined by
T (x0x1 . . . . . .x15) = x0⊕ x1⊕ x5⊕ x7⊕ x10⊕ x11⊕ x14⊕ x15.
Definition 5.3: The feedback function for the bottom
register B : F82 → F2 is defined by
B(x0x1 . . .x7) = x1⊕ x2⊕ x3⊕ x7.
Definition 5.4 (Selection function):
The selection function select : F2×F2×F
8
2 → F
3
2 is de-
fined by
select(x,y,r) = z0z1z2
where
z0 = (r0∧ r2) ⊕ (r1∧ r3) ⊕ (r2∨ r4)
z1 = (r0∨ r2) ⊕ (r5∨ r7) ⊕ r1 ⊕ r6 ⊕ x ⊕ y
z2 = (r3∧ r5) ⊕ (r4∧ r6) ⊕ r7 ⊕ x
Definition 5.5 (Successor state): Let s = 〈l,r, t,b〉 be a
cipher state, k ∈ (F82)
8 be a key and y ∈ F2 be an input bit.
Define the successor cipher state s′ = 〈l′,r′, t ′,b′〉 as
t ′← (T (t) ⊕ r0 ⊕ r4)t0 . . . t14
l′← (k[select(T (t),y,r)] ⊕ b
′)⊞ l⊞ r
b′← (B(b) ⊕ r7)b0 . . .b6
r′← (k[select(T (t),y,r)] ⊕ b
′)⊞ l
We define the successor function suc which takes a key k ∈
(F82)
8, a state s and an input y∈ F2 and outputs the successor
state s′. We overload the function suc to multiple bit input
x ∈ Fn2 which we define as
suc(k,s,ε) = s
suc(k,s,x0 . . .xn) = suc(k,suc(k,s,x0 . . .xn−1),xn)
Definition 5.6 (Output): Define the function output which
takes an internal state s= 〈l,r, t,b〉 and returns the bit r5. We
also define the function output on multiple input bits which
takes a key k, a state s and an input x ∈ Fn2 as
output(k,s,ε) = ε
output(k,s,x0 . . .xn) = output(s) ·output(k,s
′,x1 . . .xn)
where s′ = suc(k,s,x0).
Definition 5.7 (Initial state): Define the function init which
takes as input a key k ∈ (F82)
8 and outputs the initial cipher
state s= 〈l,r, t,b〉 where
t ← 0xE012 l← (k[0] ⊕ 0x4C)⊞0xEC
b← 0x4C r← (k[0] ⊕ 0x4C)⊞0x21
Definition 5.8 (MAC function): Define the function
MAC: (F82)
8×Fn2 → F
32
2 as
MAC(k,m) = output(k,suc(k, init(k),m),032)
6. Weakness in iClass
This section describes weaknesses in the design and imple-
mentation of iClass. We present four weaknesses that are
later exploited in Section 6.5 to mount a attack that recovers
the systems master key.
k[0]
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select(·)
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⊕
⊕
output
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Figure 9: The iClass cipher
6.1. Weak keys
The cipher has a clear weakness when the three rightmost
bits of each key byte are the same. Let us elaborate on that.
Proposition 6.1: Let β be a bitstring of length three. Then,
for all keys k ∈ F642 of the form k= α[0]β . . .α[7]β with α[i] ∈
F
5
2 the cipher outputs a constant Cβ .
This is due to the fact that the output of the cipher is
determined by the three rightmost (least significant) bits of
register r, the three rightmost bits of l and the three rightmost
bits of the selected key byte XOR b. Furthermore, only the
rightmost bit of r influences register b. This means that the
5 leftmost bits of r and the 5 leftmost bits of each key byte
affect only the key byte selection, but for the key under
consideration this does not affect the output. The same holds
for cC and nR as they are just input to the select(·) function.
The following table shows the corresponding MAC value for
each possible value of β .
The manufacturer seems to be aware of this feature of the
cipher since the function hash0, used in key diversification,
prevents such a key from being used. This weakness com-
bined with the weakness described in Section 6.2 and 6.3
results in a vulnerability exploited in Section 6.5.
6.2. XOR key update weakness
In order to update a card key, the iClass reader does not
send the new key to the card in the clear but instead it sends
the XOR of the old and the new key (see Section 3.1). This
simple mechanism prevents an adversary from eavesdropping
the new key during key update. Although, this key update
mechanism introduces a new weakness, namely, it makes it
possible for and adversary to make partial modifications to
the existing key. A key update should be an atomic operation.
Otherwise it allows an adversary to split the search space in
a time-memory trade-off. Moreover, in case the cipher has
some weak keys like the ones described in Section 6.1, it
allows an adversary to force the usage of one of these keys.
6.3. Privilege escalation
Several privilege escalation attacks have been described in
the literature [KSRW04], [DDSW11]. The privilege escala-
tion weakness in iClass concerns the management of access
rights over an application within the card. After a successful
authentication for application 1 has been executed, the reader
is granted read and write access to this application. Then, it
is possible to execute a read command for a block within
application 2 without loosing the previously acquired access
rights. More precisely, a read command on block n within
application 2, with n 6= cC, returns a sequence of 64 ones
which indicates that permission is denied to read this block.
Surprisingly, this read attempt on application 2 does not
affect the previously acquired access rights on application 1.
This read command though, has the side effect of loading
the key k2 into the internal state of the cipher. In particular,
from this moment on the card accepts write commands on
application 1 that have a valid MAC computed using key k2.
6.4. Lower card key entropy
After careful inspection of the function hash0 (Sec-
tion 4.3.2) it becomes clear that this function attempts to
fix the weak key weakness presented in this section.
The function hash0 makes sure that, when looking at the
last bit of each key byte, exactly four of them are zeros (and
the other four of them are ones). Due to this restriction there
are only 8!
(4!)2
= 70 possibilities for the last bits of each key
byte, instead of 28 = 256, reducing the entropy of the key by
1.87 bits. This constitutes the biggest part of the 2.23 bits
entropy loss (Section 4.3.4) that is caused by hash0.
6.5. Key recovery attack on iClass Standard
This section shows how the weaknesses described in Sec-
tion 6 can be exploited. Concretely, we propose an attack
that allows an adversary to recover a card key by wirelessly
communicating with a card and a reader. Once the card key
has been recovered, the weak key diversification weakness
described in Section 4.3 can be exploited in order to recover
the master key. Next, we describe the attack in detail.
In order to recover a target card key k1 from application
1, an adversary A proceeds as follows. First, A eavesdrops
a legitimate authentication trace on the e-purse with key k1,
while making sure that the e-purse is not updated. If the
reader attempts to update the e-purse, this can be prevented
by playing as man-in-the-middle or by simply jamming the
e-purse update message. Next, the adversary replays this
authentication trace to the card. At this point the adversary
gains read and write access to application 1. Although, in
order to actually be able to write, the adversary still needs to
send a valid MAC with k1 of the payload. To circumvent this
problem, the adversary proceeds as described in Section 6.3,
exploiting the privilege escalation weakness. At this point the
adversary still has read and write access to application 1 but
he is now able to issue write commands using MACs gener-
ated with the default key k2 [HID06] to write on application
1. In particular, A is now able to modify k1 at will. Exploiting
the XOR key update weakness described in Section 6.2, the
adversary modifies the card key k1 into a weak key by
setting the three rightmost bits of each key byte the same.
Concretely, the adversary runs 23×7 = 221 key updates on
the card with ∆ = 05δ[0] . . .0
5δ[6]0
8 ∈ F642 and δ[i] = abc∈ F
3
2
for all possible bits a,b and c. One of these key updates will
produce a weak key, i.e., a key of the form k=α[0]β . . .α[7]β
with α[i] ∈ F
5
2. Exploiting the weak key weakness described
in Section 6.1, after each key update A runs 8 authentication
attempts, one for each possible value of β , using the MAC
values shown in Figure 10. Note that a failed authentication
will not affect the previously acquired access rights. As soon
as an authentication attempt succeeds, the card responds
with a MAC value that univocally determines β as stated in
Proposition 6.1. Knowing β , the adversary is able to recover
the three rightmost bits of k1[i] by computing β ⊕ δ[i] for
i = 0 . . .6. Furthermore, the three rightmost bits of k[7] are
equal to β ⊕ 000 = β . In this way, the adversary recovers
3× 8= 24 bits of k1 and only has to search the remaining
40 bits of the key, using the legitimate trace eavesdropped
in the beginning for verification.
This attack can be further optimized. The restriction on
the last bit of each byte imposed by hash0, described at
β Cβ =MAC(k,cC ·nR)
000 BF 5D 67 7F
001 10 ED 6F 11
010 53 35 42 0F
011 AB 47 4D A0
100 F6 CF 43 36
101 59 7F 4B 58
110 1A A7 66 46
111 E2 D5 69 E9
Figure 10: Corresponding MAC for each value of β
the end of Section 6.4, reduces the number of required key
updates from 221 to almost 219. Therefore, it reduces the total
number of authentication attempts to 219× 8 = 222. Once
the adversary has recovered the card key k1, as we already
mention in Section 6.4, recovering the master key is just as
hard as breaking single DES.
7. iClass Elite
This section describes in detail the built-in key diversification
algorithm of iClass Elite. Besides the obvious purpose of
deriving a card key from a master key, this algorithm intends
to circumvent weaknesses in the cipher by preventing the
usage of certain ‘weak’ keys. In this way, it is patching a
weakness in the iClass cipher. After the description of the
iClass Elite key diversification in Section 7.1 we describe the
weaknesses of this scheme in Section 7.2. Finally, the third
and fastest attack of this paper, concerning iClass Elite, is
given in Section 7.3.
First, recall the key diversification of the iClass Standard
system that we described in Section 4.2. In this scheme,
the iClass reader first encrypts the card identity id with the
master key K , using single DES. The resulting ciphertext
is then input to a function called hash0 which outputs
the diversified key k, i.e., k = hash0(DESenc(K , id)). Here
the DES encryption of id with master key K outputs
a cryptogram c of 64 bits. These 64 bits are divided as
c = 〈x,y,z[0], . . . ,z[7]〉 ∈ F
8
2 × F
8
2 × (F
6
2)
8 which is used as
input to the hash0 function. This function introduces some
obfuscation by performing a number of permutations, com-
plement and modulo operations. Besides that, it checks for
and removes patterns like similar key bytes, which could
produce a strong bias on the cipher. Finally, the output of
hash0 is the diversified card key k = k[0], . . . ,k[7] ∈ (F
8
2)
8.
Remark 7.1: The DES implementation used in iClass is
non-compliant with the NIST standard [FIP99]. Concretely,
iClass deviates from the standard in the way of representing
keys. According to the standard a DES key is of the form
〈k0 . . .k6p0, . . . ,k47 . . .k55p7〉 where k0 . . .k55 are the actual
key bits and p0 . . . p7 are parity bits. Instead, in iClass, a
DES key is of the form 〈k0 . . .k55p0 . . . p7〉.
7.1. Key diversification on iClass Elite
The iClass Elite system is sold as a more secure and advanced
solution than the iClass Standard variant. HID introduces
iClass Elite (a.k.a. High Security) as the solution for “those
who want a boost in security” [Cum03]. iClass Elite aims
to solve the obvious limitations of having just one single
world-wide master key for all iClass systems. Instead, iClass
Elite allows customers to have a personalized master key for
their own system. To this purpose, HID has modified the key
diversification algorithm, described in Section 4.2 by adding
an additional layer to it. This modification only affects the
way in which readers compute the corresponding card key
but does not change anything on the cards themselves. This
section describes this key diversification algorithm in detail.
Then, Section 7.2 describes two weaknesses that are later
exploited in Section 7.3.
We first need to introduce a number of auxiliary functions
and then we explain this algorithm in detail.
Definition 7.1 (Auxiliary functions): Let us define the
following auxiliary functions. The bit-rotate left function
rl : F82 → F
8
2 as rl(x0 . . .x7) = x1 . . .x7x0.
The bit-rotate right function
rr : F82 → F
8
2 as rr(x0 . . .x7) = x7x0 . . .x6.
The nibble-swap function swap
swap : F82 → F
8
2 as swap(x0 . . .x7) = x4 . . .x7x0 . . .x3.
Definition 7.2: Let the function hash1 : (F82)
8 → (F82)
8 be
defined as
hash1(id[0] . . . id[7]) = k[0] . . .k[7]
where
k[i]=k
′
[i] mod 128, i= 0 . . .7
k′[0]= id[0]⊕·· ·⊕ id[7] k
′
[4]= rr(id[4]⊞ k
′
[2]
)+ 1
k′[1]= id[0]⊞ . . .⊞ id[7] k
′
[5]= rl(id[5]⊞ k
′
[3]
)+ 1
k′[2]= rr(swap(id[2]⊞ k
′
[1])) k
′
[6]= rr(id[6]⊞ (k
′
[4]⊕3C))
k′[3]= rl(swap(id[3]⊞ k
′
[0])) k
′
[7]= rl(id[7]⊞ (k
′
[5]⊕C3))
Definition 7.3: Define the rotate key function rk : (F82)
8×
N→ (F82)
8 as
rk(x[0] . . .x[7],0) = x[0] . . .x[7]
rk(x[0] . . .x[7],n+ 1) = rk(rl(x[0]) . . . rl(x[7]),n)
Definition 7.4: Let the function hash2 : (F82)
8 → (F642 )
16
be defined as hash2(K cus) = y[0]z[0] . . .y[7]z[7] where
z[0] = DESenc(K
cus,K cus)
z[i] = DESdec(rk(K
cus, i),z[i−1]) i= 1 . . .7
y[0] = DESdec(z[0],K cus)
y[i] = DESenc(rk(K
cus, i),y[i−1]) i= 1 . . .7
Next we introduce the Selected key. This key is used as
input to the standard iClass key diversification algorithm. It
is computed by taking a selection of bytes from hash2(K cus).
This selection is determined by each byte of hash1(id) seen
as a byte offset within the bitstring hash2(K cus).
Definition 7.5: Let h ∈ (F82)
128. Let ksel ∈ (F82)
8 be the
Selected key defined as
h← hash2(K cus); ksel[i] ← h[hash1(id)[i]] i= 0 . . .7
The last step to compute the diversified card key is just like
in iClass
k← hash0(DESenc(k
sel , id))
7.2. Weaknesses in iClass Elite key diversification
This section describes two weaknesses in the key diver-
sification algorithm of iClass Elite. These weaknesses are
exploited in Section 7.3 to mount an attack against iClass
Elite that recovers the custom master key.
7.2.1. Redundant key diversification on iClass Elite.
Assume that an adversary somehow learns the first 16 bytes
of hash2(K cus), i.e., y[0] and z[0]. Then he can simply recover
the master custom key K cus by computing
K
cus = DESenc(z[0],y[0]) .
Furthermore, the adversary is able to verify that he has the
correct K cus by checking the following equality
z[0] = DESenc(K
cus,K cus) .
7.2.2. Weak key-byte selection on iClass Elite. Yet an-
other weakness within the key diversification algorithm of
iClass Elite has to do with the way in which bytes from
hash2(K cus) are selected in order to construct the key ksel .
As described in Section 7.1, the selection of key bytes from
hash2(K cus) is determined by hash1(id). This means that
only the card’s identity decides which bytes of hash2(K cus)
are used for ksel . This constitutes a serious weakness since no
secret is used in the selection of key bytes at all. Especially
considering that, for some card identities, the same bytes
of hash2(K cus) are chosen multiple times by hash1(id). In
particular, this implies that some card keys have significantly
lower entropy than others. What is even more worrying, an
adversary can compute by himself which card identities have
this feature.
Card identity id hash1(id) Recovery
00 0B 0F FF F7 FF 12 e0 01 01 00 00 45 01 45 45 Byte 00, 01 in 224
00 04 0E 08 F7 FF 12 e0 78 02 00 00 45 01 45 45 Byte 02 in 216
00 09 0D 05 F7 FF 12 e0 7B 03 00 00 45 01 45 45 Byte 03 in 216
00 0A 0C 06 F7 FF 12 e0 7A 04 00 00 45 01 45 45 Byte 04 in 216
00 0F 0B 03 F7 FF 12 e0 7D 05 00 00 45 01 45 45 Byte 05 in 216
00 08 0A 0C F7 FF 12 e0 74 06 00 00 45 01 45 45 Byte 06 in 216
00 0D 09 09 F7 FF 12 e0 77 07 00 00 45 01 45 45 Byte 07 in 216
00 0E 08 0A F7 FF 12 e0 76 08 00 00 45 01 45 45 Byte 08 in 216
00 03 07 17 F7 FF 12 e0 69 09 00 00 45 01 45 45 Byte 09 in 216
00 3C 06 E0 F7 FF 12 e0 20 0A 00 00 45 01 45 45 Byte 0A in 216
00 01 05 1D F7 FF 12 e0 63 0B 00 00 45 01 45 45 Byte 0B in 216
00 02 04 1E F7 FF 12 e0 62 0C 00 00 45 01 45 45 Byte 0C in 216
00 07 03 1B F7 FF 12 e0 65 0D 00 00 45 01 45 45 Byte 0D in 216
00 00 02 24 F7 FF 12 e0 5C 0E 00 00 45 01 45 45 Byte 0E in 216
00 05 01 21 F7 FF 12 e0 5F 0F 00 00 45 01 45 45 Byte 0F in 216
Figure 11: Chosen card identities
7.3. Key recovery attack on iClass Elite
In order to recover a master key K cus, an adversary
proceeds as follows. First, exploiting the weakness described
in Section 7.2.2, the adversary builds a list of chosen card
identities like the ones shown in Figure 11. This Figure
contains a list of 15 card identities and their corresponding
key-byte selection indices hash1(id). The selection of card
identities in this list is malicious. They are chosen such that
the resulting key ksel has very low entropy (in fact, it is
possible to find several lists with similar characteristics).
For the first card identity in the list, the resulting key ksel
is built out of only three different bytes from hash2(K cus),
namely 0x00, 0x01 and 0x45. Therefore, this key has
as little as 24 bits of entropy (instead of 56). Next, the
adversary will initiate an authentication protocol run with
a legitimate reader, pretending to be a card with identity
id = 0x000B0FFFF7FF12E0 as shown in the list. Fol-
lowing the authentication protocol, the reader will return a
message containing a nonce nR and a MAC using k. The
adversary will repeat this procedure for each card identity
in the list, storing a tuple 〈id,nC,nR,MAC〉 for each entry.
Afterwards, off-line, the adversary tries all 224 possibilities
for bytes 0x00, 0x01 and 0x45 for the first key identity.
For each try, he computes the resulting k and recomputes
the authentication run until he finds a MAC equal to the one
he got from the reader. Then he has recovered bytes 0x00,
0x01 and 0x45 from hash2(K cus).
The adversary proceeds similarly for the remaining card
identities from the list. Although, this time he already knows
bytes 0x00, 0x01 and 0x45 and therefore only two bytes
per identity need to be explored. This lowers the complexity
to 216 for each of the remaining entries in the list. The bytes
that need to be explored at each step are highlighted with
boldface in the list. At this point the adversary has recov-
ered the first 16 bytes of hash2(K cus). Finally, exploiting
the weakness described in Section 7.2.1, the adversary is
able to recover the custom master key K cus with a total
computational complexity of 225 DES encryptions.
8. Conclusion
We have shown that the security of several building blocks
of iClass is unsatisfactory. Again, obscurity does not provide
extra security and there is always a risk that it can be
circumvented. In fact, experience shows that instead of
adding extra security it often covers up negligent designs.
It is hard to imagine why HID decided, back in 2002, to
use single DES for key diversification considering that DES
was already broken in practice in 1997 [LG98]. Especially
when most (if not all) HID readers are capable of computing
3DES. Another unfortunate choice was to design their pro-
prietary hash0 function instead of using an openly designed
and community reviewed hash function like SHA-1. From
a cryptographic perspective, their proprietary function hash0
fails to achieve any desirable security goal.
Furthermore, we have found many vulnerabilities in the
cryptography and implementation of iClass that result in
two key recovery attacks. Our first attack requires one
eavesdropped authentication trace with a genuine reader
(which takes about 10ms). Next, the adversary needs 222
authentication attempts with a card, which in practice takes
approximately six hours. To conclude the attack, the adver-
sary needs only 240 off-line MAC computations to recover
the card key. The whole attack can be executed within a day.
For the attack against iClass Elite, an adversary only needs
15 authentication attempts with a genuine reader to recover
the custom master key. The computational complexity of
this attack is negligible, i.e., 225 DES encryptions. This
attack can be executed from beginning to end in less than
five seconds. We have successfully executed both attacks in
practice and verified the claimed attack times.
This article reinforces the point that has been made
many times: security by obscurity often covers up negligent
designs. The built-in key diversification and especially the
function hash0 is advertised as a security feature but in fact it
is a patch to circumvent weaknesses in the cipher. The cipher
is a basic building block for any secure protocol. Experience
shows that once a weakness in a cipher has been found, it is
extremely difficult to patch it in a satisfactory manner. Using
a well known and community reviewed cipher is a better
alternative. The technique described in [RSH+12] could be
considered as a palliating countermeasure for our first attack.
More is not always better: the key diversification algorithm
of iClass Elite requires fifteen DES operations more than
iClass Standard while it achieves inferior security. Instead, it
would have been more secure and efficient to use 3DES than
computing 16 single DES operations in an ad hoc manner.
Furthermore, NIST have proposed a statistical test
suite [RSN+01] that can be used to measure the crypto-
graphic strength of a cipher. Although this might identify
weaknesses in a cipher, still many weaknesses arise from
mistakes in the implementation. In order to find these prob-
lems, it is good practice to incorporate some form of formal
verification in the development and implementation of secu-
rity products, see for instance [FL12]. Also, systematic and
automated model checking techniques proposed in [Tre08]
can help to detect and avoid implementation weaknesses like
the privilege escalation in iClass. Alternatively, formalizing
the whole design in a theorem prover [Bla01], [JWS11] may
reveal additional weaknesses. It remains an open question
whether the unusual data structures and functions that we
recovered in this paper can be recovered using automated
techniques, like for example with Howard [SSB11]. Auto-
mated techniques might speed up and assist in the reverse
engineering of algorithms and data structures from software
binaries. In line with the principles of responsible disclosure,
we have notified the manufacturer HID Global and informed
them of our findings back in November 2011. By the time
of writing this article, HID has extended their product line
with support for AES-enabled Mifare DESFire EV1 cards34
which provide higher security levels for those customers con-
sidering migration alternatives. A practical counter-measure
until migration would be to stop using the iClass Elite
diversification scheme and only use iClass Standard with
customized master keys for all applications. However, such
measure should only be considered as a temporary mitigation
and not as a definite solution as the (more expensive) attack
on iClass Standard still applies.
3. www.hidglobal.com/iclass-hf-migration-reader-family-datasheet
4. www.hidglobal.com/mifare-desfire-ev1-card-datasheet
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